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Abstract
Bit commitment involves the submission of evidence from one party to another so
that the evidence can be used to confirm a later revealed bit value by the first party,
while the second party cannot determine the bit value from the evidence alone. It is
widely believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible due
to quantum entanglement cheating, which is codified in a general impossibility theo-
rem. In this paper, the scope of this general impossibility proof is analyzed, and gaps
are found. Two variants of a bit commitment scheme utilizing anonymous quantum
states and decoy states are presented. In the first variant, the exact verifying mea-
surement is independent of the committed bit value, thus the second party can make
it before the first party opens, making possible an unconditional security proof based
on no-cloning. In the second variant, the impossibility proof fails because quantum
entanglement purification of a mixed state does not render the protocol determinate.
Whether impossibility holds in this or similar protocols is an open question, although
preliminary results already show that the impossibility proof cannot work as it stands.
PACS #: 03.67Dd, 03.65Bz
Note:
We have made a few clarifications and elaborations in this revision.
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I Introduction
Quantum cryptography [1], the study of information security systems involving quantum
effects, has recently been associated almost exclusively with the cryptographic objective of
key distribution. This is due primarily to the nearly universal acceptance of the general
impossibility of secure quantum bit commitment (QBC), taken to be a consequence of the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type entanglement cheating which rules out QBC and other
quantum protocols that have been proposed for various other cryptographic objectives [2].
In a bit commitment scheme, one party, Adam, provides another party, Babe, with a piece
of evidence that he has chosen a bit b (0 or 1) which is committed to her. Later, Adam
would “open” the commitment: revealing the bit b to Babe and convincing her that it is
indeed the committed bit with the evidence in her possession. The usual concrete example
is for Adam to write down the bit on a piece of paper which is then locked in a safe to be
given to Babe, while keeping for himself the safe key that can be presented later to open the
commitment. The evidence should be binding, i.e., Adam should not be able to change it,
and hence the bit, after it is given to Babe. It should also be concealing, i.e., Babe should
not be able to tell from it what the bit b is. Otherwise, either Adam or Babe would be able
to cheat successfully.
In standard cryptography, secure bit commitment is to be achieved either through a
trusted third party or by invoking an unproved assumption on the complexity of certain
computational problem. By utilizing quantum effects, various QBC schemes not involving a
third party have been proposed that were supposed to be unconditionally secure, in the sense
that neither Adam nor Babe can cheat with any significant probability of success as a matter
of physical laws. In 1995-1996, a general proof on the impossibility of unconditionally secure
QBC and the insecurity of previously proposed protocols were described [3]-[5]. Henceforth,
it has been generally accepted that secure QBC and related objectives are impossible as a
matter of principle [6]-[10].
There is basically just one impossibility proof, which gives the EPR attacks for the cases of
equal and unequal density operators that Babe has for the two different bit values. The proof
shows that if Babe’s successful cheating probability PBc is close to the value 1/2, which is
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obtainable from pure guessing of the bit value, then Adam’s successful cheating probability
PAc is close to the perfect value 1. This result is stronger than the mere impossibility of
unconditional security, namely that it is impossible to have both PBc ∼ 1/2 and PAc ∼
0. Since there is no known characterization of all possible QBC protocols, logically there
can really be no general impossibility proof even if it were indeed impossible to have an
unconditionally secure QBC protocol.
In this paper, the formulation within which the general impossibility proof was developed
will be analyzed. The mechanism for the success of the impossibility proof within a limited
scope will be delineated. It is shown that the use of classical randomness unknown to
one of the two parties, common in many standard cryptographic protocols, is not properly
accounted for in the previous impossibility proof formulation. In particular, the turning
of classical randomness into quantum determinateners via quantum purification of a mixed
quantum state does not render a quantum protocol determinate with no further role for
classical randomness, as described in the impossibility proof. Specifically, a scheme utilizing
anonymous states and decoy states will be presented, and the different ways in which the
impossibility proof fails for these variants will be explicitly pinpointed. The results are
developed within nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, unrelated to relativistic protocols [11]
or cheat-sensitive protocols [12]. Since bit commitment leads to “coin-tossing” and other
cryptographic protocols, our present results have immediate impact on many recent works
on quantum coin-tossing and multiparty computation.
To provide a foretaste of the failure of the impossibility proof, the following two points
may be mentioned. First, the impossibility proof has no role for any possible classical
randomness that Babe may introduce, which, even after quantum purification, would actually
be explicitly used by her in her verification of the bit. If the use of such randomness by Babe is
taken into account, it is not hard to see that the success of Adam’s EPR cheat may depend on
knowing the actual value of such random numbers. Secondly, there are concealing protocols
for which Babe can make all the measurements for verification before Adam opens because
the verifying measurement is independent of the bit value, with no consequent possibility that
an information carrying state needs to be discarded due to measurement basis mismatch.
This kind of protocol is one of several types outside the impossibility proof formulation.
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Indeed, a general formulation of all possible QBC protocols is not yet available that includes
a proper expression of just the concealing condition, not to mention both concealing and
binding with corresponding expressions for the cheating probabilities.
In section II, the impossibility proof would be described and extended. The mechanism
of its success within its limited scope will be highlighted. In section III, the use of anony-
mous states in QBC will be developed, in which Babe uses classical random numbers in
the most direct way in protocols involving two-way quantum communication. It is explicity
demonstrated that the impossibility proof, specifically the use of the doctrine “Church of
Larger Hilbert Space,” fails to cover such situations in two different ways. In section IV,
our basic scheme is introduced in a preliminary form which is not yet unconditionally se-
cure but which already invalidates the impossibility proof. Two variants of the scheme are
described. One of which, QBCp3m, allows Babe to make perfect verifying measurements
before Adam opens. The reader is urged to first read Appendix D for a concise presentation
of this basically rather simple protocol, as it confirms our statement above that there can be
no general impossibility proof without a characterization of all possible QBC protocols. In
section V, the protocol QBCp3m is extended to fully unconditionally secure ones together
with their security proofs. Some general and practical observations are made in the last
section VI. Note that the same index may denote different quantities in different sections,
and the notation ⊗ is often omitted for brevity.
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II The Impossibility Proof
In this Section we review the standard formulation of the impossibility proof, present some
pertinent new results, and explain the precise mechanism of the EPR cheating.
According to the impossibility proof, Adam would generate |Φ0〉 or |Φ1〉 depending on b
= 0 or 1,
|Φ0〉 =
∑
i
√
pi|ei〉|φi〉, (1)
|Φ1〉 =
∑
i
√
p′i|e′i〉|φ′i〉 (2)
where the states {|φi〉} and {|φ′i〉} in HB are openly known, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, {pi} and {p′i}
are known probabilities, while {|ei〉} and {|e′i〉} are two complete orthonormal sets in HA.
All Dirac kets are normalized in this paper. Adam sends Babe HB while keeping HA to
himself. He opens by measuring the basis {|ei〉} or {|e′i〉} in HA according to his committed
state |Φ0〉 or |Φ1〉, resulting in a specific |φi〉 or |φ′i〉 on HB, and telling Babe which i he has
obtained. Babe verifies by measuring the corresponding projector and will obtain the value
1 (yes) with probability 1. In this formulation, Adam can switch between |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉 by
operation on HA alone, and thus alter the evidence to suit his choice of b before opening the
commitment. In the case ρB0 ≡ trA|Φ0〉〈Φ0| = ρB1 ≡ trA|Φ1〉〈Φ1|, the switching operation is
to be obtained by using the so-called “Schmidt decomposition [13],” the expansion of |Φ0〉
and |Φ1〉 in terms of the eigenstates |φˆk〉 of ρB0 = ρB1 with eigenvalues λk and the eigenstates
|eˆk〉 and |eˆ′k〉 of ρA0 and ρA1 ,
|Φ0〉 =
∑
k
√
λk|eˆk〉|φˆk〉, |Φ1〉 =
∑
k
√
λk|eˆ′k〉|φˆk〉 (3)
By applying a unitary UA that brings {|eˆk〉} to {|eˆ′k〉}, Adam can select between |Φ0〉 or |Φ1〉
any time before he opens the commitment but after he supposedly commits. When ρB0 and
ρB1 are not equal but close, it was shown that one may transform |Φ0〉 by an UA to a |Φ˜0〉
with |〈Φ1|Φ˜0〉| as close to 1 as ρB0 is close to ρB1 according to the fidelity F chosen, and thus
the state |Φ˜0〉 would serve as the effective EPR cheat.
In addition to the above quantitative relations, the gist of the impossibility proof is
supposed to lie in its generality – that any QBC protocol could be fitted into its formulation,
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as a consequence of various arguments advanced in [3]-[10]. Among other reasons, it appeared
to the present author from his development of a new cryptographic tool, anonymous quantum
key technique [14], that the impossibility proof is not sufficiently general. Since there is no
need for Adam to entangle anything in an honest protocol. Adam can just send Babe a
state |φi〉 with probability pi when he picks b=0. When he picks b=1, he sends |φ′i〉 with
probability p′i. If the anonymous key technique is employed, |φi〉 and |φ′i〉 are to be obtained
from applying U0i or U1i from some fixed openly known set of unitary operators {U0i} and
{U1i} on HB by Adam to the states |ψ〉 sent to him by Babe and known only to her. As
a consequence, Adam would not be able to determine the cheating unitary transformation
UA. This use of anonymous states is not explicitly accounted for in the open literature,
and the role of classical random numbers in the problem formulation is not clearly and
fully laid out in the impossibility proof. However, it seems the prevailing opinion is that
the impossibility proof covers classical randomness in essence, basically through the use of
quantum purification of classical randomness [4], [7], [15]. This claim that the impossibility
proof covers all classical randomness has never been explicitly demonstrated, and it is one
major purpose of this paper to show that such a claim is erroneous. The gap in the reasoning,
to be delineated in section III, is best appreciated after a careful quantitative development
of the impossibility proof to be presently given.
In a QBC protocol, the {|φi〉} and {|φ′i〉} are chosen so that they are concealing as
evidence, i.e. Babe cannot reliably distinguish them in optimum binary hypothesis testing
[16]. They would also be binding if Adam is honest and sends them as they are above,
which he could not change after Babe receives them. Babe can always guess the bit with a
probability of success PBc = 1/2, while Adam should not be able to change a committed bit
at all. However, it is meaningful and common to grant unconditional security when the best
P¯Bc Babe can achieve is arbitrarily close to 1/2 and Adam’s best probability of successfully
changing a committed bit P¯Ac is arbitrarily close to zero even when both parties have perfect
technology and unlimited resources including unlimited computational power [4].
The operation of unitary transformation with subsequent measurement of an orthonormal
basis is equivalent to the mere measurement of another orthonormal basis {|e˜i〉} on the
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system. Thus, the net cheating operation can be described by writing
|Φ0〉 =
∑
i
√
p˜i|e˜i〉|φ˜i〉, (4)
√
p˜i|φ˜i〉 ≡
∑
j
√
pjVji|φj〉 (5)
for a unitary matrix V defined by |ei〉 = ∑j Vij |e˜j〉, and then measuring |e˜i〉. For convenience,
we may still in the rest of the paper refer to the cheating operation as a UA transformation
described at the beginning of this Section, with |ei〉 = UA|e˜i〉. From (5), the |φ˜i〉 obtainable
by operation on HA alone are some unitary linear combinations of the |φi〉. The quantitative
expression for PAc can now be given. If Babe verifies the individual |φ′i〉, the Adam’s successful
cheating probability is
PAc =
∑
i
p˜i|〈φ˜i|φ′i〉|2. (6)
When randomness from Babe is present, further averaging is needed to yield the final PAc .
The EPR cheating mechanism is clear from (5)—via entanglement and measurement of a
different basis, Adam can generate unitary linear combinations of the committed states |φi〉 to
approximate the states |φ′i〉. The approximation is guaranteed to be good when the protocol
is concealing, as follows.
In general, the optimal cheating probability P¯Bc for Babe is given by the probability of
correct decision for optimally discriminating between two density operators ρB0 and ρ
B
1 by
any quantum measurement. For equal a priori probabilities,
P¯Bc =
1
4
(2 + ‖ρB0 − ρB1 ‖1) (7)
where ‖ · ‖1 is the trace norm, ‖τ‖1 ≡ tr(τ †τ)1/2, for a trace-class operator τ [17]. In terms
of a security parameter n that can be made arbitrarily large, the statement of unconditional
security (US) can be quantitatively expressed as
(US) lim
n
P¯Bc =
1
2
and lim
n
P¯Ac = 0. (8)
Condition (US) is equivalent to the statement that for any ǫ > 0, there exists an n0 such
that for all n > n0, P¯
B
c − 12 < ǫ and P¯Ac < ǫ, i.e. P¯Bc − 12 and P¯Ac can both be made
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arbitrarily small for sufficiently large n. The impossibility proof claims more than the mere
impossibility of (US), it asserts [3] the following statement (IP):
(IP) P¯Bc =
1
2
+O(
1
n
)⇒ P¯Ac = 1− O(
1
n
) (9)
Condition (9) implies the following limiting statement
(IP′) lim
n
P¯Bc =
1
2
⇒ lim
n
P¯Ac = 1. (10)
that directly contradicts (8). One may regard (IP’) as the general impossibility statement,
independently of the specific convergence rate of (9). In the ρB0 = ρ
B
1 case, the EPR cheat
shows that P¯Bc =
1
2
implies P¯Ac = 1. Thus (IP’) generalizes it to the assertion that the
function P¯Ac (P¯
B
c ), obtained by varying n, is continuous from above at P¯
B
c =
1
2
. Note the
difference between the truth of (IP’) and the weaker statement that (US) is impossible. In
the middle ground that limn P¯
B
c =
1
2
implies just 0 < limn P¯
A
c < 1, the protocol would
be concealing for Babe and quantitatively cheat-sensitive for Adam. However, it may be
expected that if P¯Ac is not close to 1, it may be made close to 0 in an extension protocol
which thus becomes unconditionally secure.
The cheating transformation for the ρB0 6= ρB1 case is determined from ref. [18] according
to the impossibility proof [3]-[4], which would proceed as follows. Let |λi〉 and |µi〉 be the
eigenstates of ρB0 and ρ
B
1 with eigenvalues λi and µi. The Schmidt normal forms of the
purifications |Φ0〉 and |Φ1〉 of ρB0 and ρB1 are given by
|Φ0〉 =
∑
i
√
λi|fi〉|λi〉, (11)
|Φ1〉 =
∑
i
√
µi|gi〉|µi〉 (12)
for complete orthonormal sets {|fi〉} and {|gi〉} on HA. Define the unitary operators U0, U1
and U2 by
U0|λi〉 = |µi〉, (13)
U1|λi〉 = |fi〉, (14)
U2|µi〉 = |gi〉. (15)
9
Let U be the unitary operator for the polar decomposition of
√
ρB0
√
ρB1 ,
√
ρB0
√
ρB1 =
∣∣∣∣
√
ρB0
√
ρB1
∣∣∣∣U. (16)
Then |〈Φ0|Φ1〉| assumes its maximum value F (ρB0 , ρB1 ), F (ρ0, ρ1) ≡ tr
√√
ρ0ρ1
√
ρ0, when
UUT2 U0U
T
0 U
T †
1 = I (17)
where T denotes the transpose operation. Thus, when ρB0 , ρ
B
1 , and |ei〉 are given, |gi〉 = |e′i〉
of |Φ1〉 is determined from (12) via solving for U2 from (17). In general, these U ’s are
isometries, but the above relations still hold.
The above formulation (11)-(17), utilizing Jozsa’s proof [18] of Uhlmann’s theorem, covers
both the ρB0 = ρ
B
1 case and the U
A = I (i.e., |Φ0〉 = |Φ1〉) situation as special cases.
Apparently form these equations, knowledge of the eigenstates of ρB0 and ρ
B
1 is required to
find the cheating transformation UA that brings |ei〉 to |e˜i〉. Actually, both (11)-(17) and
the Schmitt decomposition obscure the underlying mechanism of the EPR cheating given by
(5). In the present context, they suggest that knowledge of the ρBb eigenstates is needed to
determine UA, which is actually much simpler determined by the following
Theorem 2:
The UA that maximizes |〈Φ˜0|Φ1〉|, defined through the matrix U, Uij ≡ 〈ei|UA|ej〉, is
determined by
ΛU = |Λ| (18)
where
Λij ≡
√
p′ipj〈φ′i|φj〉, |Λ| ≡ (ΛΛ†)
1
2 (19)
When pi = p
′
i, the corresponding
P˜Ac =
∑
i
(|Λ|ii)2 (20)
which satisfies
F 2 ≤ P˜Ac ≤ F (21)
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The lower bound in (21) is valid also for pi 6= p′i.
Theorem 2 is proved in Appendix A. Note that in terms of the V in (5), U = VT . The
bounds (21) simply characterize P˜Ac in terms of F , and yield P¯
A
c ≥ F 2 for the actual optimal
probability P¯Ac that maximizes (6). This lower bound yields the usual impossibility proof [3]
or (IP) of (9) when combined with the lower bound on || · ||1 in terms of F [19]. When Λ is
invertible, U = Λ−1|Λ| from (18). In general, one does not need to compute the eigenstates
of ρBb to find U
A, which is determined through Λ that is given directly in terms of the known
states and probabilities.
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III The Impossibility Proof and Anonymous States
The use of anonymous states by Babe as briefly described in the last section is just one
obvious way to introduce classical randomness for her in a QBC protocol, which appears
to thwart Adam’s EPR cheating by denying him the knowledge to find the proper cheating
transformation. The ways in which the impossibility proof fails in this situation are detailed
in this section.
In general, such use of anonymous states by Babe can be described as follows. She sends
Adam a state |ψ〉 ∈ HB known only to herself. Depending on b = 0 or 1, Adam applied
to |ψ〉 a unitary operator Ubi, i ∈ {1; . . . ,M} with probabilities pi or p′i. In the notation of
section II,
|φi〉 = U0i|ψ〉, |φ′i〉 = U1i|ψ〉 (22)
Adam sends the modulated state back to Babe, and opens by revealing b and i. He can form
the entangled |Φ0〉 by applying the unitary operator U0 on HA ⊗HB,
U0 =
∑
i
|ei〉〈ei| ⊗ U0i (23)
with initial state |A〉 ∈ HA satisfying 〈ei|A〉 = √pi. It appears from Theorem 2 above that
the cheating transformation UA as determined by 〈φ′i|φj〉 = 〈ψ|U †1iU0j |ψ〉 would depend on
|ψ〉 in general, thus cannot be found by Adam. The impossibility proof handles this situation
rather explicitly in [4], [6], [10], and [15], in the following way.
The state |ψ〉 is supposed to be picked by Babe from a set {|ψk〉}, k ∈ {1, . . . , L} with
probabilities λk that are all openly known. The associated classical randomness is then
purified by having Babe generate the entangled state
|Ψ〉 =∑
k
√
λk|ψk〉|fk〉, (24)
where the |fk〉’s are complete orthonormal in HC, send HB to Adam while keeping HC to
herself. At the end of the commitment phase she would measure {|fk〉} to pin down a
specific |ψk〉. The proof, however, is not carried to the end, and the above description is
considered sufficient to ensure that the impossibility proof works in the presence of classical
randomness introduced by Babe—from quantum entanglement purification of a mixed state
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and postponement of all measurements to end of commitment, the classical randomness is
rendered quantum-mechanically determinate and everything is known to Adam again for
him to find the cheating transformation UA. While Babe may not actually form |Ψ〉, the
so-called “Church of Larger Hilbert Space” doctrine [20] is used to justify the equivalence. In
the following, it will be shown that the equivalence does not hold when Babe does something
else to cheat, and that theimpossibility proof does not go through even when Babe actually
forms |Ψ〉 and postpone her measurement on HC until after Adam opens.
To spell out the impossibility proof argument, one actually needs to show that UA is
independent of {|fk〉} in HC and Adam only needs HB, not the full |Ψ〉 of (24), to form
his entanglement. These turn out to be true as a consequence of (18) in Theorem 2 above.
However, it is against common probabilistic intuition that randomness would altogether
disappear (to Adam) upon a quantum interpretation. There is no reason why Babe has to
generate (24) instead of any specific |ψk〉. More generally, to form |Ψ〉, Babe can choose any
probability distribution on {|ψk〉}, not the {λk} that Adam believes. It is not a meaningful
formulation to assume that Adam knows {λk}. Thus, one cannot eliminate via quantum
purification what is nonrandom to Babe (upon her choice or measurement) and random
to Adam [21]. Indeed, Babe can generate any state |ψ〉 ∈ HB, or any entangled state
|Φ〉 ∈ HB⊗HC for any HC that she keeps to herself. A careful formulation for the concealing
condition needs to be developed.
To show the inadequacy of the formulation of the impossibility proof, assume that ρB0 (Ψ)
and ρB1 (Ψ) are indeed close from the use of (22) and (24) with λk = 1/L for L large. Let |ψ1〉
be such that ρB0 (ψ1) and ρ
B
1 (ψ1) are far apart, being possible even though ρ
B
0 (Ψ) and ρ
B
1 (Ψ)
are close because 1/L is small. Then Babe can cheat by using λ1 = 1 instead of λk = 1/L.
To ensure a concealing protocol, one must impose the uniformity condition
ρB0 (ψ) ≈ ρB1 (ψ), ∀ψ ∈ HB, (25)
or, more generally,
ρBC0 (Ψ) ≈ ρBC1 (Ψ), ∀Ψ ∈ HB ⊗HC (26)
for any HC Babe can use to entangle, with ≈ being taken in the sense of trace norm from (7).
Such a concealing condition has not been given in the literature, but it is needed whenever
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a state is passed from Babe to Adam in a proper formulation of the problem. From the
condition ρBC0 (Ψ) ≈ ρBC1 (Ψ) for a fixed Ψ, one may at best conclude that ρB0 (ψk) ≈ ρB1 (ψk)
for those k where λk 6≈ 0. Thus, the impossibility proof errs in asserting that Adam can
cheat under the above condition—he cannot, and Babe can instead. In Appendix B, an
example is given in which ρBC0 (Ψ) = ρ
BC
1 (Ψ) for a given Ψ, but Adam cannot cheat even
when no λk is small.
Assuming that condition (25) is satisfied, let us examine how Adam’s EPR cheating
works. If one follows the impossibility proof, it would work if Babe verifies on the state |Ψ〉
of (24), i.e., depending on b = 0 or 1 she checks whether |Ψ〉 becomes
Ubi|Ψ〉 =
∑
k
√
λkUbi|ψk〉|fk〉 (27)
for the i opened by Adam. However, that is not the way she verifies according to the
protocol. She would make a preliminary measurement of {|fk〉} first with result j and then
check whether the state is Ubi|ψj〉. She can in fact postpone her measurement on HC until
after Adam opens. The important point is that she is going to make a measurement and use
the result in the verification. While such measurement does not allow her to cheat any better,
it may help defeat Adam’s EPR cheating. In the impossibility proof there is no role given
to any classical randomness other than {pi} and {p′i}—it is implicitly assumed that Babe’s
random number known only to herself is not used in her verification as just described. Such
lack of utilization of possible classical randomness represents a huge gap in the impossibility
proof, making it severely limited in scope and incorrect as a general proof. The doctrine
of the “Church of Larger Hilbert Space” is irrelevant to the protocol behavior as it should
be; it would not make the protocol determinate. It is clear that classical random numbers
can be generated by both Adam and Babe in a general quantum protocol, which are kept
secret from the other party and used in an essential way as in many standard cryptographic
protocols. The impossibility proof does not begin to incorporate such possibilities.
We examine more exactly how the impossibility proof fails in the present situation. The
cheating transformation UA is taken to be the one that maximizes |〈Φ1|UA|Φ0〉|, not the
one that maximizes PAc of (6). However, in addition to the lower bound in (21) that applies
also to P¯Ac , in general U
A is determined by the inner product matrix 〈φ′i|φj〉, apart from the
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a priori probabilities. Any such cheating U is thus determined via
∑
k λk〈ψk|U †1iU0j |ψk〉 ≡ u¯ij
for |Ψ〉, but via 〈ψk|U †1iU0j |ψk〉 ≡ ukij for each |ψk〉. There is no reason to expect that the U
as determined by u¯ij would be close to the U determined by u
k
ij, whatever the λk’s are.
Actually, one does not need to transform among the maximizing U in order for impos-
sibility to hold. The general problem can be cast as follows. From (22) and (5), we have
dependence of the committed and cheating states on the anonymous state |ψ〉, to be simply
denoted by φi(ψ), φ
′
i(ψ), and φ˜i(ψ) for notational simplicity dropping the Dirac kets, as
already done occasionally above. In the present formulation with only anonymous states
from Babe in the form (22), all of Adam’s possible attacks are described by local measure-
ments and announcing a different b. For this attack to succeed with P¯Ac ∼ 1 given |Φ0〉 is
committed, one presumably wants
φ˜i(ψ) ≈ φ′i(ψ), ∀ψ ∈ HB (28)
or
φ˜i(Ψ) ≈ φ′i(Ψ), ∀Ψ ∈ HB ⊗HC (29)
for some fixed UA or V independent of ψ, the ≈ in (28)-(29) taken in the sense of state inner
product. Condition (28) expresses the requirement that as the anonymous state |ψ〉 changes,
the approximate state φ˜i(ψ) must follow the b = 1 states φ
′
i(ψ). Strictly, the condition is
only that there exists a V such that the PAc (ψ) given by (6) satisfies
PAc (ψ) ≈ 1 , ∀ψ ∈ HB (30)
where the ψ-dependence enters through φi(ψ) and φ
′
i(ψ). The problem of impossibility (IP’)
becomes whether (30) holds when (25) is satisfied. A similar condition is obtained for Ψ
that includes Babe’s possible entanglement of the anonymous state in HB.
In the case of perfect security, the above use of anonymous states cannot prevent the
success of EPR attacks due to
Theorem 3 [22]:
The condition
ρB0 (ψ) = ρ
B
1 (ψ) , ∀ψ ∈ HB (31)
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implies, for every i,
φ˜i(ψ) = φ
′
i(ψ) , ∀ψ ∈ HB (32)
The proof is simple—by writing out (31) in terms of Ubi, it follows from theorem 8.2 of
[23] on the freedom of CP-map decomposition that
√
p′iU1i =
∑
j
√
pjVjiU0j (33)
for a unitary matrix V. This operator relation guarantees that the state relation (32) is
satisfied for all |ψ〉.
When (31) is satisfied and (18) is used to compute the cheating UA(ψ) according to
Theorem 2, it is found to be independent of |ψ〉 and is given by the V of (33) due to the fact
that the matrix 〈φ′i|φj〉 becomes V multiplied by the inner product matrix 〈φi|φj〉 which is
nonnegative. Indeed, the V in (33) is also determined by following the usual impossibility
proof for any ψ. (Note that the Schmidt decomposition plays no role in the proofs of theorems
2 and 3 and in the results used in their proofs. Indeed, Jozsa’s proof of Ulhmann’s theorem
in [18], which involves the Schmidt decomposition, can also be simplified along the line in the
proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A.) Theorem 3 is significant in that it shows it is operator,
not state, entanglement that is needed in the presence of state randomness.
Under the condition
ρBC0 (Ψ) = ρ
BC
1 (Ψ) (34)
for one fixed |Ψ〉 of the form (24), one obtains similar to the proof of Theorem 3 that
ρB0 (ψ) = ρ
B
1 (ψ) ∀ψ ∈ span{|ψk〉}. (35)
Equation (35) implies, in particular, that ρB0 (ψk) = ρ
B
1 (ψk) for each |ψk〉 and a fixed cheating
transformation is available as above. The restriction on the validity of (35), and hence the
possibility of Adam’s successful cheating, to states in the subspace spanned by {|ψk〉} is
indispensable as shown in the example of Appendix B. We can summarize our two major
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criticisms of the impossibility proof. First and foremost, it is not properly formulated so
that under (34) or
ρBC0 (Ψ) ≈ ρBC1 (Ψ) (36)
for one fixed |Ψ〉 of (24), it may be Babe but not Adam who can cheat, either because she
may sent |ψ〉 6∈ span{|ψk〉}, or there is a λk ≈ 0 for which ρB0 (ψk) 6≈ ρB1 (ψk). Secondly, even
assuming |Ψ〉 is formed by Babe, there is no proof that there is any cheating transformation
that would work for all |ψk〉.
Another way to formulate the problem at hand is to use CP-map or superoperator to
characterize the transition from ψ to ρBb , similar to the proof of Theorem 3. If two general CP-
maps between operators on H1 and H2 are approximately equal in the sense of (25) with ψ ∈
H1, the question is what approximate relation would obtain between the positive operators
in their respective decompositions. This question is a complicated one for application to
our present problem, partly because when ǫ = ‖ρB0 (ψ) − ρB1 (ψ)‖1 gets small, the security
parameter n grows unbounded and the resulting HB and ρBb change profoundly. An infinite-
dimensional nonseparable Hilbert space formulation of the problem appears necessary at
the beginning. Until the question is settled in favor of impossibility, there is no general
impossibility proof for protocols employing anonymous states even just in the simple fashion
of (22).
The QBC formulation in this section, while more general than that of the impossibility
proof which is a proper formulation only if the randomness in the protocol are all in (1)-(2), is
still quite limited in scope. Indeed, the protocols of the following sections IV and V already do
not fit into the present framework exactly. There are many other ways to introduce classical
randomness in a protocol. Even though they can be represented quantum-mechanically, once
measurements are made to pin them down they would function just as in a classical protocol,
manifesting in the different ways the measurement results can be utilized. Just in the case of
classical protocols, it does not appear possible to characterize all QBC protocols to a useful
extent that something general can be said about the corresponding cheating probabilities.
We will present elsewhere a general formulation of the QBC problem. It will be evident that
the situation is far more intricate than the impossibility proof formulation (1)-(2).
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IV Bit Commitment Scheme that Contradicts the
Impossibility Proof
In this section, a protocol will be given that contradicts the quantitative claim of the im-
possibility proof, (IP) of (9) or (IP’) of (8), without yet being unconditionally secure in the
sense (US) of (8). Its extensions to unconditionally secure protocols will be given in the
next section V. An intuitive description on how the QBC scheme may be developed is first
provided to explain the underlying logic.
According to the impossibility proof formulation, there is a state |Φb〉 of (1) - (2) shared
by Adam and Babe. The most general attack by Adam after |Φ0〉 is committed is to apply
a local UA on HA and then make a measurement on HA, or just to make a measurement on
HA as in (4)-(5), and opens b = 1. It is evident, from the way states in HB can be affected
this way as given by (5), that if M = 1 in (1) Adam cannot affect ρB0 = |φ〉〈φ| in HB at all.
Unconditional security is impossible in this case because P¯Bc ∼ 12 implies |〈φ|φ′〉| ∼ 1 and
thus P¯Ac ∼ 1 by simply announcing b = 1. If one lets |〈φ|φ′〉| 6∼ 1 then Babe can cheat by
measurement and the protocol is not concealing. Our protocols are to be developed form
the following sequence of steps in general. To be specific, qubits will be used in this section.
To begin, let |φ〉 and |φ′〉 corresponding to b = 0, 1 be orthogonal so that Adam cannot
cheat. To defeat Babe’s cheating, Adam may send to Babe the information qubit among
many random decoy states, named for example by their temporal order, and announce the
information qubit position when he opens. To prevent Adam from the obvious cheating of
sending in both |φ〉 and |φ′〉 and opening accordingly, an anonymous state |ψ〉 is first sent by
Babe, with Adam generating |φ〉 = U0|ψ〉, |φ′〉 = U1|ψ〉 for U0 = I, U1,= R(θ, C) a rotation
by an angle θ on some great circle C on the qubit Bloch-Poincare sphere. The rotation can
be applied by Adam without knowing |ψ〉 assuming, as usual, that the orientations of all
the qubit Bloch spheres are known to both Adam and Babe. Thus, 〈φ|φ′〉 = 0 for |ψ〉 ∈ C
and θ = π. It can be intuitively expected that Babe cannot then determine b with P¯Bc ∼ 12
in the presence of sufficiently many decoy states. It should also be clear that Babe cannot
improve his P¯Bc by entanglement to |ψ〉, because she already chooses a |ψ〉 that allows her
to make perfect discrimination if she knows which qubit is the one she sent, and so she has
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no need to change |ψ〉 when she tries to cheat.
How about Adam’s new possibilities of cheating at this stage? In all uses of anonymous
states, the other party can always try to determine the state by measurement on the single
copy. It is characteristics of quantum physics that the state cannot be determined and cannot
be cloned [24]-[25] arbitrarily accurately, if it is drawn from a nonorthogonal set of states.
However, Adam has a significant probability of success in such attempts, thereby such single
use of qubit cannot yield an unconditionally secure protocol—P¯Bc ∼ 12 and P¯Ac 6∼ 1 but not
P¯Ac ∼ 0. More precisely, with n being the number of decoys states plus |ψ〉, one would have
lim
n
P¯Bc =
1
2
, 0 < lim
n
P¯Ac < 1 (37)
The protocol is thus concealing and quantitatively cheat-sensitive for Adam. If Adam indeed
cannot do better than cloning, the impossibility proof is contradicted with (37) and thus is
incorrect as a general proof.
A way to achieve (37), which has important practical significance, is for Babe to make
verifying measurements on all the qubits before Adam opens. She would choose the basis
corresponding to {|ψ〉, R(π, C)|ψ〉} for all n qubits. Babe can evidently check whether Adam
opens correctly in a perfect fashion when he identifies the qubit. It is intuitively clear, and
will be explicitly proved below, that the protocol is concealing. By entangling to the qubit
in state |ψ〉 in the form
λ0U0|ψ〉|e0〉+ λ1U1|ψ〉|e1〉 (38)
Adam can find out Babe’s measurement result but he cannot change it for cheating, as
a matter of course—whatever operations and measurements he performs cannot affect the
result Babe already obtained. A precise treatment of the above protocol QBCp3m, a pre-
liminary (not yet unconditionally secure) protocol with Babe’s measurement before opening,
is detailed presently, to be followed by the security proof.
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PROTOCOL QBCp3m
(i) Babe sends Adam a state |ψ〉 known only to herself, randomly picked from a fixed
known great circle C on the Bloch sphere of the qubit HB2 .
(ii) Adam modulates |ψ〉 by U0 = I or U1 = R(π, C), rotation of |ψ〉 to its orthogonal
state on C, for b = 0 or b = 1. He then picks n − 1 qubits with states independently and
randomly chosen among all possible ones, and places the modulated qubit HB2 randomly
among them. He sends the n resulting qubits to Babe, each named by its position in the
qubit sequence from 1 to n.
(iii) Babe measures {|ψ〉, R(π, C)|ψ〉} on each qubit. Adam opens by revealing the posi-
tion of HB2 and the bit value. Babe verifies by checking her measurement result on HB2 .
We first show that this QBCp3m is concealing. For each possible ith position for HB2 in
the qubit sequence sent back by Adam, the state is of the form, in HB,
|φ1〉 · · · · · ·Ub|ψ〉 · · · |φn〉
i
(39)
where each |φj〉, j ∈ {1, · · · , n} and j 6= i, is, say, one of the four BB84 states on C randomly
and independently chosen. The index “i” underneath the state Ub|ψ〉 in (39) indicates that
it occupies the ith position. Thus, the state to Babe is of the form, in HB
ρBb =
1
n
∑ I
2
⊗ . . .⊗ σb ⊗ . . .⊗ I2 ,
i i
(40)
with σb = UbσU
†
b when Babe send a state σ to Adam without entanglement. Note that it is
sufficiently for Adam to choose among two orthogonal states instead of all possible ones for
each qubit, and for Babe to choose among four BB84 states instead of all in a great circle.
While it should be clear that Babe gains nothing with entanglement, that situation will be
dealt with later. From (40), one can evaluate P¯Bc straightforwardly since ρ
B
0 −ρB1 is diagonal
in the product basis that diagonalized σ0 − σ1 on each qubit. Let n = 2ℓ+ 1 and λ+ ≤ 1 be
the positive eigenvalue of σ0 − σ1, it is shown in Appendix C that
P¯Bc −
1
2
=
λ+
2n
(
2ℓ
ℓ
)
(41)
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The optimal probability (41) is obtained with λ+ = 1 when the above product basis is
measured and b is set to be 0 or 1 according to a majority rote on the positive and negative
outcomes corresponding to the eigenvectors |λ+〉 and |λ−〉. From the standard bounds on
binomial coefficients,
1
4
√
ℓ
< P¯Bc −
1
2
<
1
2
√
πℓ
(42)
The optimal strategy is thus still concealing with limn P¯
B
c =
1
2
, but it is better than guessing
at the qubit sent and then measure and decide on it alone, which yields PBc =
1
2
(1 + 1/n).
To show that entanglement does not change the above situation in the simplest possible
way, we would merely give a detailed proof that concealing is not affected by Babe’s entan-
glement. When she entangles HB2 to a HC she would attach HC to one of the qubits sent
back by Adam. The resulting density operator is the same independently of which particular
qubit position she attaches HC to, from symmetry. From the triangle inequality for trace
norm [18], the distance between the resulting P¯Bb is bounded by
n ‖ ρB0 − ρB1 ‖1 ≤ 2+ ‖ ρ¯B0 − ρ¯B1 ‖1 (43)
where the term 2 is the maximum possible [23, App A] distance ‖ ρ0 − ρ1 ‖1 for any states
ρ0 and ρ1, corresponding to the case where HC is attached correctly to HB2 . The ρ¯Bb are
the same as (40) because the mismatched HC state does not affect the trace distance as a
consequence of
‖ (ρ− ρ′)⊗ σ ‖1=‖ ρ− ρ′ ‖1 (44)
Equation (44) follows immediately from evaluating the left-hand side in the diagonal repre-
sentation of (ρ− ρ′)⊗σ. Thus, the protocol is still concealing from (42) and (43). Actually,
it can be shown that the optimal P¯Bc of (41) without entanglement remains optimal with en-
tanglement. Note that our proof shows that the protocol is concealing for any |ψ〉 ∈ HB2 even
though we may impose restriction on |ψ〉 in the binding proof or for ease of implementation.
Since Babe’s verifying measurement can be perfectly made before Adam opens, a “no-
clone” argument can be developed for binding. Adam cannot find out what measurement
basis, not to mention |ψ〉, Babe used by entangling the qubits to HA—the state on HA
is obtained by tracing over HB and is independent, not only of |ψ〉, but of the specific
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measurement basis Babe uses (or no measurement from her at all). Thus, he can gain no
information from Babe’s measurement to help him cheat in any way. One way for Adam to
cheat is by cloning, as it is the same whether one wants to get {|ψ〉, |ψ〉} or {|ψ〉, U |ψ〉} for a
known U . The optimal cloning performance is a fixed number pA < 1 independent of n. The
optimal one-to-two clone has been worked out for a variety of criteria and state sets. In the
present situation, the state set is C or the four BB84 states. If the cloning is described by
|ψ〉 → |ψab〉 over two qubits with marginal states ρa and ρb, the criterion here corresponds
to
Fc =
1
2
〈ψ|ρa|ψ〉av + 1
2
〈ψ|U †1ρbU1|ψ〉av (45)
with average over a uniform distribution on the state set from which |ψ〉 is drawn. It seems
that the existing results [26]-[27] almost cover this case exactly [28]. Now, it appears that
Adam cannot do better than this optimum by any action because if he could, he should
have succeeded in cloning better than the optimal cloner, a contradiction, according to
the following reasoning. He would have, by an objective physical procedure, succeeded in
producing clones among n qubits, where he could identify which ones are the clones. If Babe
did not measure first, this would not be surprising because the two copies are obtained on
two different conditional (upon Adam’s measurement result) states for Babe. The fact that
Adam can identify both means that he could not just spread n − 1 qubit states uniformly
on C, one of which would be close to U |ψ〉, but he wouldn’t be able to tell which one.
That he is not able to identify both simulatneously does not alter the fact he has cloned.
Alternatively consider the following situation with the cloning of one copy of |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 into
{|ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉, |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉}, for a criterion as (41), with optimum pA < 1. If Babe gets identical
measurement results on two sets of n qubits sent back to her by Adam, each obtained by the
same procedure as above, Adam would have succeeded in cloning |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 by carrying out
the two different identification procedures on the two n-qubit sets and applying the results to
both sets. To ensure that Babe could have the identical measurement results almost surely,
consider the following Gedankenexperiment. Babe sends a large number N of identical states
|ψ〉 to Adam, who carries out the same objective physical preparation (cheating) procedure
on her N n-qubit sets. Babe performs her measurement on each and every set, obtaining,
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with probability exponentially close to 1, pairs of identical results that total N ′ sets with
N ′/N close to 1 for sufficiently large N . Adam would then have, via the above separate
identification procedure on each pair, succeeded in cloning in almost all of the original N
sets. Both the above single-set argument and the present N -set argument are valid, but a
complete formalization of the arguments will be given elsewhere.
Note that, in this protocol, Adam cannot cheat any better by generating decoy states
other than I/2. Thus we have covered all possible actions by Adam and Babe, and can
summarize the above results as
Theorem 4:
In protocol QBCp3m, Babe’s optimal cheating probability can be made arbitrarily close
to 1
2
for large number of qubits n, while Adam’s optimal cheating probability remains fixed
and not arbitrarily close to 1.
What would happen to Adam’s EPR attack in the above scheme if Babe performs her
verifying measurement after he opens? One may have the protocol “QBC3” in reference [29]
in which Babe disregards the n − 1 qubits not first sent by her. It is simpler to consider
the following variant more in line with the impossibility proof formulation. Let |ψ〉 ∈ S =
{|1〉, |2〉, |3〉, |4〉} where |1〉 and |2〉 are the vertical and horizontal states on C, and |3〉 and
|4〉 are the two orthogonal diagonal ones, so together they make up the four standard BB84
states on C. Consider the case where each of the other n − 1 qubits sent by Adam has to
be in S ′ = {|1〉, |2〉}. Adam modulates |ψ〉 by Ub and opens by identifying the HB2 position
and the states of all the qubits. Babe verifies by performing the corresponding projection
measurements. Let |ψ〉 be purified as
1
4
4∑
ℓ = 1
|ℓ〉|fℓ〉 (46)
for |ℓ〉 ∈ S ⊂ HB2 and orthonormal|fℓ〉 ∈ HC . Let U1j , j ∈ {2, · · · , n} be the unitary operator
that swaps qubit position 1 and j on HB = HB2
⊗n
j=2Hj2. On HA ⊗HB, Adam can form the
entanglement by employing orthonormal |ei〉 ∈ HA, i ∈ {1, · · · , n · 4n−1}, with uniform or
whatever probabilities, using U1j and S
′. In analogy with QBCp3m, we have a preliminary
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protocol QBC p3u which is close to a usual one in which Adam can launch EPR attacks.
PROTOCOL QBCp3u
(i) Babe sends Adam a state |ψ〉 known only to herself, randomly picked form the four
BB84 states on a fixed great circle C of the qubit HB2 .
(ii) Adam modulates |ψ〉 by U0 = I or U1 = R(π, C) for b = 0 or 1. He then picks n− 1
qubits with states independently and randomly from two orthogonal states known to Babe,
places the modulated qubit HB2 randomly among them, and sends the n qubits to Babe in
a named order.
(iii) Adam opens by revealing the state of all the qubits and identifying HB2 . Babe verifies
by checking the corresponding projections.
This protocol is concealing exactly as in QBCp3m. As shown in section III, the impossiblity
proof does not cover this protocol. Indeed, assuming Adam opens perfectly for b = 0 as in
the impossibility proof, it can be shown that he cannot then cheat with P¯Ac ∼ 1. The basic
reason is that he can only identify correctly on the decoy states, for arbitrary |ψ〉, by not
involving |ψ〉 in the entanglement of the decoy states. However, he cannot then rotate |ψ〉
to its orthogonal complement on C. The full security proof covering the situation in which
Adam does not open perfectly is being developed.
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V Unconditionally Secure Bit Commitment Schemes
The QBC protocol in the previous section that invalidates the impossibility proof can be
extended to fully unconditionally secure protocols as described in the following. This may be
expected because if Adam cannot cheat nearly perfectly on one qubit, his cheating probability
can be brought exponentially close to zero in a sequence of independent qubits. To extend
the above protocols in this manner, first consider the case where HB2 in QBCp3m is replaced
by H¯B = ⊗mk=1HB2k. Let Babe send Adam a sequence of m qubits
|ψ〉 = |ψ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψj〉 · · · ⊗ |ψm〉, j ∈ {1, · · · , m} (47)
Each |ψj〉 is randomly and independently chosen from the same fixed great circle C for all
the m qubits, and named by its sequence position j within H¯B. Adam applies Ub to each
of these qubits and then randomly places H¯B among a sequence of N − 1 quantum spaces
HBℓ , each a product of m qubits, with states on all the m (N − 1) qubits randomly and
independent chosen from a fixed great circle C ′. The total sequence or product state
|χ1〉 · · · |χℓ〉 · · · |χN〉, ℓ ∈ {1, · · · , N} (48)
is re-named by the new position ℓ and sent back to Babe. Apart from the modulated state
in H¯B, each of the other N − 1 |χℓ〉 in HBℓ is a product of m qubit states. Each of the
N state spaces would be referred to as a qumode. Similar to (35), Adam knows, but Babe
does not, which |χℓ〉 is the modulated |ψ〉, and he opens by giving Babe this information,
but he does not know what the |ψj〉’s are. Before Adam opens, Babe measures on every
qumode the product qubit basis given by {|ψj〉, R (π, C) |ψj〉} across the m qubits, which
diagonalizes ρB0 −ρB1 . She optimally decides on b by the majority of the two patterns of |ψj〉
and R (π, C) |ψj〉, the other patterns occurring with equal probability.
To prove concealing, the following argument is used in lieu of evaluating directly the
trace distance. For any fixed m, let N be chosen large enough that the number of times
a particular pattern of |ψj〉 in (47) shows up in Babe’s measurement on a random qumode
is at least (N − 1) (2−m − δ) for a small δ > 0, where (N − 1)2−m is the average. This is
possible with a probability exponentially close to 1 from the Chernov bound. The situation
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then becomes the same as the qubit case of section IV, with n replaced by N (2−m − δ)
for the upper bound in (42), which can then be set to any desired small level by further
increasing N . Babe’s possible entanglement can be handled as in (43). Thus, the protocol
is concealing. Adam’s optimal cheating probability is given by P¯Ac = p
m
A , which fixes m for
given P¯Ac < ǫ. We summarize the results.
PROTOCOL QBC3m1
(i) Babe sends Adam a product state (47), each |ψj〉 named by its position and indepen-
dently and randomly chosen from a BB84 state set S in C.
(i) Adam modulates each and all |ψj〉 by U0 = I or U1 = R(π, C), then independently
and randomly place the exact sequence among N − 1 qumodes, each a product of m qubits
randomly distributed on S. He sends the N qumodes to Babe in a named order.
(iii) Babe measures the m {|ψj〉, R (π, C) |ψj〉} on each of the N qumodes. Adam opens
by announcing which qumode is the modulated |ψ〉 and the bit value. Babe verifies by
checking her measurement result.
Theorem 5:
Protocol QBC3m1 is unconditionally secure.
Variations of the protocol can be easily created without affecting the unconditional secu-
rity. For example, consider the case where Babe sends (47) to Adam which he returns in m
segments of N qubits each, the jth one containing exactly one |ψj〉 from (47). Babe can then
make a uniform measurement on each N -sequence, deciding whether each such N -sequence
corresponds to a 0 or 1 by a majority vote, and the overall b by a majority vote on the m
outcomes.
To show that such a protocol is concealing, one may first take care of Babe’s entanglement
possibility to HC by, similar to (43),
‖ ρB0 − ρB1 ‖1≤ [1− p(N,m)] · 2 + p(N,m)· ‖ ρ¯B0 − ρ¯B1 ‖1 (49)
where p(N,m) = (1− 1
N
)m is the probability that none of the m attached entangled qubits in
HC matches the actual qubit position, which can be made arbitrarily close to 1 for any fixed
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m by making N large. Then one argues that independent qubit probability distributions are
obtained because for optimal PBc Babe should not entangle across the qubits in (47) as that
would create additional randomness for the individual qubit measurements she would make,
the latter needed since she has a vanishingly small probability to locate her own qubits.
(Indeed, there is no point for her to correlate the |ψj〉 in the first place, as an involved
classical probabilistic argument would show.) From the independence of |χℓ〉 and the |ψj〉
positions in the m N -sequences, the optimal decision Babe can make is to decide on 0 or 1 on
each of the N -sequences as the m = 1 case, and then take a majority vote to decide on b. Let
p be the probability of Babe’s correct decision in each N -sequence. Then p is given by (41)
and bounded as in (42) with n replaced by N . The overall P¯Bc =
∑(m−1)/2
k=0 (
m
k )p
k(1 − p)m−k
can be made, for any fixed m, arbitrarily close to 1/2 by making p arbitrarily close to 1/2,
i.e., with N sufficiently large, because this P¯Bc is a continuous function of p. The value of m
is determined from pmA < ǫ from cloning. With P¯
B
c − 12 < ǫ, the unconditional security proof
is completed for the following
PROTOCOL QBC3m2
(i) Babe sends Adam a sequence of m qubits, each |ψj〉 named by its position and
independently and randomly chosen from a great circle C.
(ii) Adam modulates each and all |ψj〉 by U0 = I and U1 = R(π, C), then places each
Ub|ψj〉 independently and randomly among the jth of m succeeding N -sequences of qubits,
the states of all the other qubits independently and randomly chosen. He sends the n = mN
succeeding qubits with their position names to Babe.
(iii) Babe measures {|ψj〉, R(π, C)|ψj〉} on the N qubits of the jth sequence for all j.
Adam opens by revealing the positions of Ub|ψj〉 and the bit valve. Babe verifies by checking
her measurement results on these qubits.
Theorem 6:
Protocol QBC3m2 is unconditionally secure.
Protocols QBC3u1 and QBC3u2 can be introduced similar to the last section. They are
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omitted here since their full security proofs are not yet available.
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VI Conclusion
In this paper we have explicitly detailed two major ways in which the QBC impossibility proof
fails as a general proof. There are two corresponding significant general issues concerning
the impossibility proof. One is that classical randomness and the corresponding information
flow between the two parties may play a significant role in a general protocol. Such a
role has not been completely characterized for the classical case, and cannot be simply
eliminated by quantum purification. This points to the more general, second issue: how
one can characterize all possible QBC protocols at all when one has not been able to do
that for any type of classical cryptographic protocols. In particular, there are many possible
protocols with random numbers generated by Adam and Babe during various stages of
a protocol, necessitating uniformity conditions similar to (25) that would intertwine in a
complicated classical way that is not resolved by quantum purification. As things stand, it
is even open whether a perfectly secure QBC protocol is possible, given the limited scope of
Theorem 3.
In any event, it is possible to have unconditionally secure quantum bit commitments, as
protocols QBC3m1 and QBC3m2 demonstrate. Equally significantly, these protocols can be
carried out without any quantum memory to be used between commitment and opening.
In applications to key management or identification/authentication, such required quantum
memory would be very long on microscopic scale, at least for network type situations. It is
unrealistic to expect that such quantum memory would become available in any reasonable
amount of time. Thus, these protocols represent a major step in advancing the possible prac-
tical use of quantum bit commitment. Moreover, each qubit in the protocol can be replaced
by a full optical field mode and qubit state by large-energy coherent state, without affecting
the essential underlying operations, thus making the protocol even easier to implement. A
full description of such protocols and quantitative tradeoffs between security and complexity
will be given in a future paper.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 2
By choosing |ei〉 = |e′1〉 in (1)-(2), one obtains
|〈Φ1|UA|Φ0〉| = |trUΛ| (A1)
The maximum of |trUΛ| over all unitaryU is attained when UΛ is nonnegative definite with
maximum value given by tr|Λ| [17, p.43]. Thus U is determined by the polar decomposition
(generalization to infinite dimensional space can be obtained via maximal partial isometry)
of Λ = |Λ|U†.
With pi = p
′
i, P¯
A
c is given by (20) and is thus bounded above by
∑
i |Λ|ii which is just
tr|Λ| = F . For a set of probabilities αi and complex numbers λi, one has
∑
i
αi|λi|2 ≥ |
∑
i
αiλi|2 (A2)
as a consequence of Jensen’s inequality and the concavity of the function x 7→ x2. The lower
bound of (21) follows from (A2) with αi = pi and λi =
√
p˜i/pi〈φ˜i|φ′i〉, valid for pi 6= p′i.
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Appendix B
Example on Proper Concealing
In the notations of sections II-III, the following example shows that for (24), even with
no small λk, the condition (34) does not imply that Adam can cheat as claimed by the
impossibility proof.
Consider 2-qubit HB = H2 ⊗H2 and |Ψ〉 ∈ HB ⊗HC given by
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|a〉|a′〉|f1〉+ |a′〉|a〉|f2〉) (B1)
where |a〉 and |a′〉 are two openly known orthogonal states in H2, and |fi〉 are orthonormal
in HC , which is also a qubit. The operations are taken to be p1 = p′1 = p2 = p′2 = 12 , U01 = I,
U02 = P the permutation operator switching the two qubit positions in HB, U11 = R a
rotation that brings |a〉 to |a′〉 and |a′〉 to |a〉, U12 = RP . It follows easily that, after
entanglement by Adam, ρBC0 (Ψ) = ρ
BC
1 (Ψ) and he can cheat perfectly when Babe forms
(B1).
However, it is Babe who can actually cheat perfectly in this situation. Instead of sending
(B1) she can send |a〉|a〉 ∈ HB instead, which would defeat Adam’s cheating and allows
herself to cheat. The underlying reason is, of course,that (31) or (25) is not satisfied, and
|a〉|a〉 6∈ span{|a〉|a′〉, |a′〉|a〉}, violating the condition required for (34)-(35). Clearly, there is
no reason why Babe wants to be honest so Adam can cheat. Thus, the impossibility proof
formulation, which does not have a condition such as (36), is not a meaningful one in the
presence of random numbers, with consequent incorrect claim on same situation.
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Appendix C
Evaluation of Trace Distance
One straightforward way to evaluate ||ρB0 − ρB1 ‖1 for ρb of (40) is to directly compute the
trace norm in the product basis spanned by {|λ+〉, |λ−〉} for each qubit. Let k be the number
of |λ−〉 in a product-basis vector. One has, from a direct counting calculation,
‖ ρB0 − ρB1 ‖1=
λ+
n2n−1
n∑
k = 0
(
n
k
)
|n− 2k| (C1)
The binomial sum in (C1) can be evaluated in closed form. With n = 2ℓ+ 1,
n∑
k = 0
(
n
k
)
|n− 2k| = 2(2ℓ+ 1)
(
2ℓ
ℓ
)
(C2)
Equation (41) follows from (C1)-(C2).
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Appendix D
Simple Summary of Protocols QBCp3m, etc.
The statement, underlying logic, and security of protocol QBCp3m can be simply presented
as follows. The detailed proofs are given in the paper.
Let Babe send Adam a qubit in state |ψ〉 known only to herself, |ψ〉 ∈ C ⊂ HB2 in a fixed
great circle C of the qubit Bloch sphere. Depending on b = 0 or 1, Adam leaves it alone or
rotates it to its orthogonal state |ψ′〉, then sends it back to Babe among a number n−1 of
random decoy qubit states. Independently of b, Babe can make the same qubit measurement
of the basis {|ψ〉, |ψ′〉} on every of the n qubits before Adam opens. The protocol is still
concealing with P¯Bc → 12 as n → ∞, because she does not know which qubit is the one
she sent. It is clear that Babe cannot determine b any better by sending |ψ〉 /∈ C or by
entangling |ψ〉. Because Adam cannot gain any information on Babe’s measurement basis
via entanglement, his optimal cheating probability P¯Ac is given by an appropriate one-to-two
clone fidelity pA, which is independent of n and not arbitrarily close to 1. As he has to open
0 and 1 on two different qubits given Babe already measures, the optimality of pA would be
contradicted if he can do any better. Thus far, the quantitative claim of the impossibility
proof, (IP) of (9) or (IP′) of (10), has been invalidated by the above protocol QBCp3m.
More significantly, it shows that the impossibility proof formulation misses a whole class
of protocols in which Babe can make the verifying measurement independently of b before
Adam opens.
It is straightforward to extend QBCp3m to unconditionally secure protocols, such as
QBC3m1 and QBC3m2, by having Babe send Adam a sequence of m independent |ψi〉’s
with pmA set to any arbitrarily small value ǫ. Adam sends back each of the m uniformly
modulated qubits in different restricted ways among n qubits. Babe makes the corresponding
measurements before Adam opens. The resulting protocols are concealing with n sufficiently
large for any fixed m, which is determined by Adams optimal cheating probability P¯Ac = p
m
A ,
and are thus fully unconditionally secure in the sense (US) of (8).
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